Abstract: Ubiquitous healthcare service is one of the major fields of research for wireless body area networks (WBANs). Ensuring complete and a good level of security for such types of WBANs, is not a trivial task. It is practically impossible to deal with all sorts of security threats with a single mechanism. This paper reviews Khan et al.'s authentication protocol for healthcare service over WBANs and shows that it does not provide forward secrecy. Furthermore, this paper proposes a remedy protocol for Khan et al.'s authentication protocol and the previous related protocols. The proposed protocol could be utilized as a basic security building block for healthcare applications based on WBANs.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are an emerging technology in existing research and have the potential to make human life more comfortable. Sensor node is the smallest unit of a network that has unique features like large scale deployment, mobility, reliability, and so on. A WSN consists of a group of nodes with low cost, low power, less memory, and limited computational power that communicate wirelessly over limited frequencies at low bandwidth [1] , [2] . The main goals of WSNs are to deploy a number of sensor nodes over an unattended area, and collect the environmental data and transmit it to the base station or remote location. Later, the raw data is processed online or offline for detailed analysis at the remote server according to the application requirements.
At the same time, meeting the potential of WSNs in healthcare, called as wireless body area networks (WBANs) requires addressing a multitude of technical challenges. These challenges reach above and beyond the resource limitations that all WBANs face. Specifically, unlike applications in other domains, healthcare applications impose stringent requirements on system reliability, quality of service and particularly privacy and security [3] - [6] . Ensuring complete and a good level of security for such types of WBANs, is not a trivial task. As these types of networks use wireless communications, the threats and attacks against them are more diverse and often very large in scale. It is practically impossible to deal with all sorts of security threats with a single mechanism. Instead, a combination of different security schemes for a single network could be the solution [7] . After the development of simple user authentication schemes in [8] - [12] , schemes for WSNs and WBANs have also attracted to the researchers. Some works has proposed for healthcare applications using WBANs [13] - [17] . Kumar et al. observed that most of the schemes in [8] - [10] fall short to provide security [User Registration Phase] The user (professional) U registers itself to the GW-node in registration center of the hospital. In the following manner: 1) User choses her/his identity IDu and submits it to the GW node using a secure channel. 2) On receiving IDu the GW node computes Cug, Ku, and Kg as in (1), (2) and (3), respectively.
3) GW node stores {h(.), Cug} into a SC, and provides SC along with values {Ku, Kg} to U through the secure channel. 4) On obtaining SC with the information {h(.), Cug} and {Ku, Kg}, the user U chooses his (or her) password PWu and computes Nu, PKu and PKg as in (4), (5) and (6), respectively. Finally, U inserts Nu, PKu and PKg in SC, so that SC stores {h(.), Cug, Nu, PKu, PKg}.
[Patient Registration Phase] A patient has to register itself in registration center of the hospital. Patient submits his (or her) name to the registration center. On receiving patient's name, the registration center chooses a suitable medical sensor kit (i.e., MS nodes and GW node) according to the disease of the patient and assigns medical professionals (users). Then the registration center transmits the identity IDpt of the patient along with medical sensors kit information to the assigned professionals/users. Finally, a technician deploys MS-node on the body of the patient.
[Login Phase] A professional logs into the GW node in order to gain patients' medical data via WMSN. The user inserts her/his SC into the smart card reader and inputs IDu and PWu. Then the SC performs the following: 1) Retrieves Ku and Kg as in (7) and (8), and computes Nu* as in (9) . If Nu* is the same with Nu, it continues further; otherwise stops the session.
2) Generates a random nonce M and computes Cu1 and CIDu as in (10) and (11), respectively. (13) and sends {Cg1, Tg} to U. Acquires Tgs as another current timestamp and computes Cg2 and Au as in (14) and (15), respectively. Then, the GW node sends {Cg2, Au, Tgs} to the MS node.
On receiving {Cg1, Tg} from the GW node, U verifies the legitimacy of the GW node as follows: 5) Checks if (Tu'-Tg) ≤ ∆T. If so, dumps the session; otherwise continues further. 6) Obtains (M*||Tg*||Tu*) as in (16) 
After this mutual authentication, U and GW node compute KsessU-GW as in (17) for the session key.
On receiving {Cg2, Au, Tgs} from the GW node, the MS node performs the following operations: 7) Checks if (Ts'-Tgs) ≤ ∆T. If so, terminates the session; otherwise proceeds further. 8) Obtains (CIDu*|| Tg*||M*||Tu*) as in (18) , computes Au* as in (19) and compares Au* with Au. If the verification holds, the legitimacy of the GW node is successful and hence of U.
International Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering 9) Acquires Tsg as current timestamp, computes Cs1 as in (20), and sends {Cs1, Tsg} to the GW node. Also computes Cs2* as in (21), where Ts is another current timestamp of MS node. Then, the MS node sends {Cs2*, Ts} to U.
On receiving {Cs1, Tsg} from the MS node, the GW node performs the following operations: 10) Checks if (Tg'' -Tsg) ≤ ∆T, if so, terminates the session; otherwise proceeds further. 11) Obtains (h(CIDu||Sn))* as in (22), and compares it with h(CIDu||Sn). The equivalence whether (h(CIDu||Sn))* is equivalent with h(CIDu||Sn) verifies the legitimacy of MS node.
After this mutual authentication, GW node and MS node compute KsessGW-Sn as in (23) for the session key.
On receiving {Cs2*, Ts} from the MS node, U performs the following: 12) Checks if (Tu''-Ts)≤ ∆T. If so, dumps the session, otherwise proceeds further. 13) Computes Cs2 as in (24) and compares it with Cs2*. If Cs2 is equal to Cs2*, the authenticity of MS node is verified.
After this mutual authentication, U and MS node compute KsessU-Sn as in (25) for the session key.
[Password Change Phase] U can change his (or her) password in the following manner. For this, U inserts his (or her) SC into the terminal, inputs his (or her) IDu and PWu, and opts to change his (or her) password. Then the following steps are performed to update a new password: 1) SC retrieves Ku and Kg as in (7) and (8), and computes Nu* as in (9) . If Nu* is equivalent to Nu, then proceeds further after asking for new password; otherwise discards the password change request. 2) U enters a new password (PWu)new. 3) SC computes with (Nu)new, (PKu)new and (PKg)new as in (26), (27) and (28), respectively. 
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Security Analysis on Khan et al.'s Scheme
Khan et al. argued that their scheme is secure against various attacks and provides good properties. However, this section shows that Khan et al.'s scheme does not provide forward secrecy, which is necessary property to be supported to the key agreement scheme. We need to have an assumption that attacker could get the system's long term secret key K as usual for the forward secrecy. Also, we need another assumption that attacker also could steal and read the smart card.
For the attack, first of all, an attacker could derive IDu' and IDg' by decrypting Cug on the smart card. After that, the attacker could derive Kg' with the long term secret key K and the identity of GW node IDg'. Note that Ku works as a very important key for the confidentiality of communication in between. The attacker could know Ku' from the derivations by computing h(K||IDu'||IDg') and Kgs' as in (29) and decrypt CIDu by using Ku to derive M' and Sn'. Then, the attacker could derive two session keys KsessU-GW' and KsessU-Sn' as in (30) and (31) properly. Thereby, Khan et al.'s scheme does not provide forward secrecy.
Proposed Authentication Scheme
This section proposes a new user authentication protocol for healthcare services over WBANs. The proposed protocol could provide anonymity and untraceability by adopting dynamic identity depending on the session fresh random numbers. The proposed protocol is also consisted with five phases including user registration phase, patient registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase.
User Registration Phase
The user (medical professional) U registers himself (or herself) to the GW node in registration center of the hospital in the following manner: 1) User chooses her/his identity IDu and submits it to the GW node using a secure channel. 2) On receiving IDu, the GW node computes Cug, Ku, and Kg as in (1), (2) and (3), respectively. 3) GW node stores {h(.), Cug} into a SC, and provides SC along with values {Ku, Kg} to U through the secure channel. 4) On obtaining SC with the information {h(.), Cug} and {Ku, Kg}, the user U chooses his (or her) password PWu and computes Nu, PKu and PKg as in (4), (5) and (6) 
Patient Registration Phase
A patient has to register himself (or herself) in registration center of the hospital. Patient submits his (or her) name to the registration center. On receiving the patient's name, the registration center chooses a suitable medical sensor kit (i.e., MS nodes and GW node) according to the disease of the patient and assigns medical professionals. Then, the registration center transmits the identity IDpt of the patient along with medical sensors kit information to the assigned professionals/users. Finally, a technician deploys the MS node on the body of the patient.
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Login Phase
A professional logs into the GW node in order to gain patients' medical data via a WMSN. The user inserts his (or her) SC into the smart card reader and inputs IDu and PWu. Then the SC performs the following processes: 1) SC retrieves Ku as in (7), Kg as in (8) and computes Nu* as in (9) . If Nu* is equal to Nu, SC continues further; otherwise SC stops the session. 2) Generates a random nonce a and computes A as in (32), Cu1 as in (10) and CIDu as in (11).
= -.
(32)
3) SC sends {CIDu, Cu1} as login request to GW node.
Authentication Phase
When the login request {CIDu, Cu1} from U is received by the GW node, it executes the following steps: 1) The GW node retrieves Cug as in (12) If all equivalences hold, the GW node believes the login request is come from U; otherwise the GW node terminates the login session.
3) The GW node generates a random nonce b and computes B as in (33), SKGW-U as in (34), Cg1 as in (35) and Am as in (36) and sends {Cg1, Am} to U. The GW node computes, Cg2 as in (37) and Au as in (38). Then, the GW node sends {Cg2, Au} to the MS node.
On receiving {Cg1, Am} from the GW node, U verifies the legitimacy of the GW node as follows: 4) U obtains (A*||B*) as in (39) and verifies Am and checks A* is equal with A. For Am verification, U computes SKU-GW as in (40) and Am* as in (41) and checks Am* is equal with Am. Only if they hold, the GW node is authenticated and both of U and the GW node share a session key SKU-GW, which is the same with SKGW-U correctly; otherwise U terminates the login session.
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On receiving {Cg2, Au} from the GW node, the MS node performs the following operations 5) The MS node obtains (CIDu*||A*||B*) as in (42), computes Au* as in (43) and compares Au* with Au. The equivalence check between Au* and Au verifies the legitimacy of the GW node and hence of U.
6) The MS node generates a random nonce f and computes F as in (44), SKMS-GW as in (45), Cs1 as in (46) and Ams as in (47) and sends {Cs1, Ams} to the GW node. Also the MS node computes SKMS-U as in (48), Cs2 as in (49) and Amsu as in (50). Then, the MS node sends {Cs2, Amsu } to U.
4($%& = / * 3
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On receiving {Cs1, Ams} from the MS node, the GW node performs the following operations: 7) The GW node obtains F* as in (51), SKGW-MS as in (52) and Ams* as in (53). The equivalence check between Ams* and Ams verifies the legitimacy of the MS node and the session key agreement. 
On receiving {Cs2, Amsu} from the MS node, U performs the following steps 8) U computes F* as in (54), SKU-MS as in (55) and Amsu* as in (56) and compares Amsu* with Amsu. Only if they match, U verifies the legitimacy of the MS node and the session key agreement. 
Password Change Phase
U can change his (or her) password in the following manner. For this, U inserts his (or her) SC into the terminal, inputs his (or her) IDu and PWu, and opts to change his (or her) password. Then the following steps are performed to update a new password 1) SC retrieves Ku as in (7), Kg as in (8) and computes Nu* as in (9) . If Nu* is equivalent to Nu, then proceeds further after asking for new password; otherwise discards the password change request. 2) U enters a new password (PWu)new. SC computes (Nu)new as in (26), (PKu)new as in (27) 
Security Analyses
This section provides security analysis of the proposed protocol. We will consider that the proposed protocol is secure under the same assumption subject to which Khan et al.'s protocol is attackable. The assumption is that an attacker Ua can extract the information stored inside the smart card. Also, we need to have an assumption that attacker could get the system's long term secret key K as usual for the forward secrecy.
Provides User Anonymity
If Ua intercepts the login request {CIDu, Cu1} of U, Ua needs Ku to obtain h(IDu) by decrypting CIDu. But Ua neither knows Ku nor recovers h(IDu) by extracting information {h(.), Cug, Nu, PKu, PKg} from the lost smart card of U. To take out Ku from PKu, Ua should know user's identity and password. In fact, Ku required to encrypt or decrypt CIDu is not stored directly in user's smart card and is different for each user. Therefore, Ua cannot obtain h(IDu). On the other hand, to procure identity IDu from Nu, PKu or PKg is infeasible. It requires knowledge of keys Ku and Kg to gain IDu out of PKu or PKg respectively. Moreover, one-way property of hash function does not allow the extraction of IDu out of Nu. Therefore, Ua cannot gain the identity of a user and hence the protocol provides user anonymity.
Resists Password Guessing Attack
In order to guess U's password PWu obtained from the lost SC of U, Ua requires knowledge of IDu and Ku. As described in the user anonymity part, Ua cannot gain the identity of a user either from the lost smart card of a user or from an intercepted login request. Besides, Ku is not available as plaintext in U's SC and is not obtainable from PKu without having exact values of IDu and PWu. Thus, the protocol resists password guessing attack.
Provides Secure Session Key between Every Entities
The proposed protocol establishes session key between every pair of participants. Session key between U and the GW node is computed as in (34), which depends on session dependent random numbers from each entity. Ua cannot compute SKU-GW even if the case that Ua knows A and B due to the discrete logarithm problem. Session key between the GW node and the MS node is computed as in (52) which is dynamic because of session dependent random number b and f. Session key between U and the MS node is computed as in (55) which Ua cannot compute without knowing a and f. Thus, the protocol establishes independent and secure session keys between every pair of the participants.
Provides Forward Secrecy
If we have two assumptions as the attack to Khan et al.'s scheme, the proposed protocol provides forward
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secrecy. Ua should be able to get the messages {CIDu, Cu1}, {Cg2, Au}, {Cs1, Ams} and {Cs2, Amsu}. However, there is no way Ua to know about SKU-GW, SKGW-MS and SKU-MS due to the discrete logarithm problem. Thereby, the proposed protocol provides forward secrecy.
Conclusion
This paper has been proposed a new user authentication protocol for healthcare services over WBANs. First of all, we reviewed Khan et al.'s protocol and showed that it does not provide forward secrecy. After that, we proposed a new authentication protocol to solve the problem in Khan et al.'s protocol and the previous authentication protocols. The proposed protocol could provide anonymity and untraceability, which are very necessary properties in ubiquitous healthcare applications.
